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The Limits of the Case Study: 
Exemplarity and the Reception of Classical 
Literature
Simon Goldhill
It still strikes me myself as strange that the case 
histories I write should read like short stories 
and that, as one might say, they lack the serious 
stamp of science . . . .
—Sigmund Freud
It is hard to imagine an academic field in the humanities that does not place the case study at its heart. Philosophy loves its conundrums, literary criticism its texts, history its particular stories. Even linguistics 
depends on case studies of, for example, the starred sentences when Jane 
and John fall in love but fail in grammatical nicety. Indeed—and here 
the self-reflexivity already inherent in my opening becomes almost too 
pushy—the relationship between generality and example is fundamental 
and integral to any serious academic pursuit. Even the singularity has 
become fascinating to theorists of existential risk because of its exem-
plary and generalizable qualities. It is possible to question, but not to 
dethrone, the test case, the example, the particulars, through which a 
generalization is explored. Indeed, a generalization untested through 
examples, or, even more pertinently, unapplied to examples, is of little 
if any value. In no area is this nexus of issues more insistent than in the 
burgeoning field of classical reception studies, that is, an arena where 
contemporary scholars consider how exemplary writers or artists of the 
past express themselves through their engagement with the exemplary 
cultural artifices from ancient Greece and Rome, which are themselves 
integrally informed by the rhetorical structures of mythological exem-
pla. Classicism is, after all, the exemplar of exemplification. But this 
immediate, layered complexity of the classical example in modernity 
only makes it more compelling to start the process of questioning how 
such exemplification functions.
For it is far from clear that classics or any other branch of literary 
study has in any adequate way theorized the nature of the exemplarity 
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integral to its practice.1 Back in 1992, I wrote an essay called “The Fail-
ure of Exemplarity,” a piece that attempted to demonstrate not just how 
tricky the apparently transparent process of exemplification is, but also 
how the gap between an example and the generality it aimed to prove, 
was both constitutive and damaging to the process it . . . exemplified.2 It 
was an article originally written for a lecture series set up in Cambridge 
in response to the brouhaha over whether Jacques Derrida should be 
awarded an honorary degree (a highly politicized case of making an 
example of someone), a series that was in itself a very strident, nation-
ally publicized and well-attended political event. Heady days. It seemed 
to me then, and it seems to me now, that despite the injunction of the 
discipline of rhetoric to consider precisely how to make an example, 
and despite the practice of classical scholarship, which has so often 
depended on its exempla and paradeigmata, classicists in particular have 
not yet taken up the challenge of conceptualizing this foundational 
aspect of their work.
At the heart of the problem lies a slide in the language of exemplarity 
that is all too often obscured and obscuring. The term “example” can 
be used to indicate no more than a particular instance of a general cat-
egory (and therefore of little theoretical interest or political purchase). 
So we say that “and” is an example of a conjunction. “An example of 
the category of tool is a hammer.” No more, no less. “Paradigm” has a 
similar function in the field of grammar: “I walk, you walk, he walks” 
(etc.) is the paradigm of the present indicative active verb in English. 
The notion of paradigm also allows for irregularity within an ordered 
system (“I am, you are, he is” [etc.] is an exemplary paradigm of an ir-
regular present indicative active verb).3 But the notion of the example, 
not least when it becomes discursive, also slides into the explicitly norma-
tive: “Roger Federer is an exemplary tennis player, [because . . .].” The 
sense of regularity and irregularity of the paradigm can become a fully 
moralized or politicized evaluative process. “The paradigm of political 
evil is Donald Trump . . . .” But the exemplar—the case, the case study, 
case history—is a narrativized instance that, by virtue of its individuality, 
is always in a relation of excess or lack to its comparandum or generality. 
So when Heracles is held up as an example for a person to follow, it is 
only through the negotiation of a play of difference and similarity that 
the hero functions as a model. This is so even in the minimal circum-
stances of a single word example: “Like Heracles, Roger Federer . . .” 
or “The example of Heracles shows that . . . .” “What would Jesus do?” 
has to remain a question because no subject who can ask the question 
can reasonably answer it outside the optative mood, a potential answer. 
The example of Jesus may be good to think with, but it cannot function 
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in the same way as “a hammer is an example of a tool.” Much norma-
tive discourse—with profound consequences—strives to turn a case into 
an instance, as if the excess and lack could be repressed, as if “What 
would Heracles do?” could have a certain, clear answer. In this article, 
my concern will be with such narrativized examples, under the rubric 
of the case study.
The theory of the case study has been explored since 1992 in fasci-
nating ways, especially in the history and philosophy of science, with 
a set of arguments that classicists and other literary scholars can both 
learn from and also contribute to significantly (as Geoffrey Lloyd in 
particular has already undertaken and as, from a different angle, has 
Brooke Holmes).4 I am less interested in the empirical and triumpha-
list accounts of case study methodology provided largely in the social 
sciences.5 Rather, it seems to me that the relation between narrative, 
ideology, and the form of the case study is much more pertinent for 
reception study.6 One question that might be debated is the degree to 
which forms of production determine forms of thinking: while the turn 
to a German-inspired institutionalization of the PhD in American and 
England has been well studied, the consequences for the ordering of 
knowledge arising from such professionalization has been less deeply 
investigated.7 The politics of form has become a major issue in liter-
ary criticism,8 and the form of scholarly discourse itself has become a 
recognized issue, for classicists in particular, through discussion of the 
commentary, the encyclopedia, and technical writing.9 Yet the form of 
the scholarly article (such as this), with its word limit and conspectus of 
prior opinions, or the monograph, based so often on the requirements of 
a PhD, have been less debated. There is at least a prima facie argument 
to be made that one especially familiar current template of discussion 
in reception studies, where a single author’s response to antiquity or 
a single text’s engagement with the Greek or Roman past is analyzed, 
goes hand in hand with the institutional structures of publishing and 
promotion, and that therefore here too the intellectual lineaments of 
the debate are being significantly informed by the mode of production. 
The case study and the article may well be genetically linked.
More pressing, however, at this point in the development of classical 
reception studies is the drive to reconceptualize the object of classical 
knowledge from what can profitably be termed postclassicism.10 Clas-
sicism, the ideological relation that fundamentally determined how 
antiquity has been understood in the post-Renaissance West, depends 
on two key relations to the past of antiquity. First, classicism idealizes an-
tiquity. Classicism is founded on the assumption that certain examples 
of the literature of the past are paradigmatic examples of a genre that 
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define its essence and nature. The definition of the “first class” is laid 
down by the classics. This is extended from art to the social conditions 
in which the art was made, though how these ancient social conditions 
are understood may vary radically in modern reconstructions. Even—es-
pecially—countercultural movements found their drive in an idealized 
past: for the men who desired men, ancient Greece, with its expressive 
erotics, was a place to dream of; for the radical or revolutionary, Greece 
was a site of desperately longed-for liberty. Even when the demerits of, 
say, slavery, or, from another perspective, democracy, were recognized 
within a localized argument, it was only as a foil to the prevalent ideal-
ization of the past.
Second, the past of classical antiquity is linked to the present in a 
genealogical descent. For post-Enlightenment Germans most insistently, 
intent on the Sonderweg, the special, destined journey of the German 
people, a fons et origo in ancient Greece was not just a gesture of cultural 
affiliation but also—with more horrific consequences—an assertion of 
racial privilege. The discovery—or invention—of Indo-European pro-
vided a link between India, Greece, and Germany through the blood of 
the Aryans; the Greek language was determined to have a particular and 
telling relationship with the German language; German values—with the 
full nationalist sense that Johann Gottfried Herder gave to the idea of 
das Volk—embodied the ancient principles of Greece to the extent that 
Germans could be styled the “new Dorians.”11 Such national genealo-
gies find parallels across Europe, as people strive to make themselves 
paradigms of inheritance.12
This combination of idealism and genealogy, required by classicism, 
constructs a specific object of knowledge and a specific style of knowing. 
Its archetypal science is philology, which is either linguistic—the model 
for other forms of philology—or based on archaeological method and 
material culture, so-called Sachphilologie, “Thing- or Object-Philology.” 
This could be taken to embrace all cultural forms to allow “a complete 
understanding of the Greeks”13—a principle whose prime theorist is 
August Boeckh.14 This scientific method found its roots in eighteenth-
century heroes such as Friedrich August Wolf.15 It lauded the repression 
of personal engagement or an individual’s emotional response in the 
name of empiricism and objectivity. It organized knowledge in disciplin-
ary and regulated forms, buttressed by authorized, professional status. It 
demanded that the object of knowledge be a word (treated by Wortphi-
lologie) or a thing (treated by Sachphilologie), where neither the nature of 
a word nor the nature of a thing is contested as a potentially objective, 
contained, recognizable, and describable entity. Objectivity made the 
object of knowledge; the object of knowledge reciprocally established 
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the subject who knows, the scientist.16 Classicism in this objective way 
constructs its examples to be exemplary. It puts them on a pedestal; it 
utilizes these examples in service of its idealizations and the politics that 
instantiate such idealizations.
We have never yet been modern, as Bruno Latour constantly reminds 
us, but the post-Second World War decades have witnessed a significant 
shift away from such a social and epistemological positioning of the 
subject, despite the increasing dominance of science as the model of 
knowledge.17 It can no longer be taken for granted that classical antiquity 
will be regarded as an ideal, or even as a special case for the history of 
the West. It can no longer be asserted that modernity’s relation to the 
past is one of genealogical affiliation. Where it once seemed inevitable, 
natural, and true that modern Christianity was directly linked to its ori-
gins in the earliest Christianity of the Roman Empire, now models of 
rupture, change, and difference seem required; where it once seemed 
evident that narrating stories of the Roman empire meant narrating 
stories of our ancestors and paternal models, now it is as common to 
assert the radical otherness of the past. It is not self-evident why Judith 
Butler needs Antigone to pronounce on gender relations. In short, how 
we make the past exemplary has become a different and highly prob-
lematized question.
Such generalizations would need a great deal of nuance and explo-
ration and investigation of evident countercases to make them wholly 
convincing as explanations of the condition of modernity. Nonetheless 
they are adequate for what seems to me to be a crucial grounding for our 
discussion here: namely, that the move away from classicism’s imperatives 
toward idealization and genealogical affiliation change the object of knowledge 
in classical scholarship. Antiquity has remained integral to the contem-
porary intellectual imaginary.18 Yet the challenge to the dominance of 
philology as the privileged science of Altertumswissenschaft; the challenge 
mounted by literary theory’s questioning of the canon, the status of the 
text, and the status of literary knowledge and its inherited values; the 
challenge mounted by rhetoric’s question to history, and postprocessual 
theory to archaeology; in short, the challenge by modernity to classicism, 
in questioning both the idealization and the genealogy of classicism, 
sets out to undermine both the evident object of knowledge and the 
established subject who knows. Consequently, the constantly repeated 
questions of modernity to the classical tradition have become: If this is 
an example, what is it an example of? If this is a paradigm, how does it 
establish a politics and an epistemology? How am I to be part of your 
machinery of exemplification?
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Reception theory is a key battleground in this seismic shift, because 
reception theory is inevitably focused on how the past is made exemplary. 
Again, a confessedly oversimplified model of this developing intellectual 
arena will have some heuristic purchase on understanding at least the 
direction of travel. Great men played a very large role in the early, heroic 
days of Rezeptionsgeschichte. Pioneers allowed themselves a chapter on the 
Nachleben of a great work (at the end of a book usually), which showed 
how other great men had responded to the text of the great man. This 
might take the form of so-and-so’s translation of a foundational text of 
Western culture, or a new literary version of such an icon. So, to take a 
single example that I have explored at length elsewhere, Richard Strauss’s 
opera Elektra takes as its libretto a version of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s 
play Elektra, which is a version of Sophocles’ play Electra.19 As a classicist 
and editor of Sophocles, then, Hugh Lloyd-Jones (and, following him, 
Malcolm Davies) compared the text of von Hofmannsthal with the text 
of Sophocles, literary text to literary text, to see how the modern text 
adapted the ancient.20 They considered no intermediaries, except for 
Goethe (another great man), barely any cultural context for either text, 
and no audience or performance contexts. The model here is most 
closely aligned with the most traditional form of the history of classical 
scholarship, a genre where great scholars commune with each other 
across the centuries and across geographical or intellectual contexts 
in the pure pursuit of answers to shared questions.21 Many other ver-
sions of such a limited and unnuanced construction of an intellectual 
tradition could be given and continue to be written. At one level, such 
a naive position allows classicists to look at, say, translations of ancient 
masterpieces and do no more than evaluate them as if they were student 
compositions, awarding marks for accuracy or, in a telling phrase, for 
“capturing the original.” At another level, this sort of criticism relies 
on and promotes simplified comprehensions of “the case study,” where 
the “original text” and its “reception” are treated as bounded objects 
of knowledge. It takes for granted the exemplary status of the canon 
of classical texts. It gives you exemplary great men responding to the 
exempla of antiquity. This, if you will, is reception as practiced within 
the ideological and epistemological framework of classicism.
Reception theory has constructed four particularly incisive critiques of 
this traditional model of classical reception, each of which relates to the 
central question of how the object of knowledge and the position of the 
subject who knows is articulated—and thus each opens a new perspective 
on how we recognize or construct examples. First, the recognition of 
a multiplicity of intermediaries between past and present has diffused 
the direct and unilinear genealogy of source text and response. So, a 
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translation such as von Hofmannsthal’s is written not just in response 
to a source text but also to other translations, both contemporary and 
within a tradition of translations; to models of understanding the past; 
to contemporary politics, including the politics of language; and to other 
translations of other classical works. When Robert Fagles, for example, 
begins his celebrated translation of the Iliad with the single word “Rage,” 
it would be trivial in the extreme merely to consider it as a more or 
less accurate rendition of the Greek word mênin.22 It also is set against 
versions that begin “Sing, Muse . . .”; against the biblical associations of 
the silenced and familiar translation “Wrath”; against other first-word 
crises of translation or composition, from “Arma . . .” to “Of Man’s first 
. . .” to “riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s . . .”; against modern notions and 
traditions of reflecting on extreme anger; against the professional critical 
discussion of how to translate the first word of the Iliad and its role in 
understanding the epic; against a long discussion of the degree to which 
English syntax can be distorted to capture the word order of Greek; and 
against knowing that everyone is waiting to see what the first word of 
this new translation of the Iliad will be—and revelling in a monosyllabic, 
ungrammatical shock. This diffusion of the process of reception pushes 
hard against the limits of the case study by revealing the work of limita-
tion involved in forming an example as a bounded object of study. To 
make Fagles’s “Rage” no more than an example of a modern English 
translation of an ancient Greek word, good or bad, requires ignoring 
how it is also a case study of zones of encounter between present and 
past, an intricately enfolded narrative of critical engagements. To imagine 
Fagles (or any translator) face to face with the Iliad without the swirling 
interference of innumerable intermediaries looks hopelessly blinkered. 
How diffuse or how restricted—how limited—any exemplary case is taken 
to be, then, will depend on a set of critical commitments, which can be 
more or less misrecognized, disavowed, and/or made explicit.
Second—and this follows from the first point—reception theory has 
begun to focus on the temporality of the exemplar. At one level, schol-
ars have insisted on the present of any interaction with the past, even 
and especially when taking an example from the past. So, as Charles 
Martindale has been particularly influential in asserting, if “meaning is 
realised at the point of reception,” meaning is not integral to or inher-
ent in a text of antiquity; and, what is more, later traditions create the 
meaning of texts of antiquity, as the filters of the tradition of reading 
produce the understanding of a community.23 Thus, with a willful re-
versal of the ineluctable directionality of time, it makes sense to talk of 
Hegel’s influence on Sophocles. A recognition of the constitutive role 
of the history of reading in the construction of the object of knowledge 
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will inevitably change its status as a paradigm and thus its role in any 
case study. At what point, then, it may be asked, does classical reception 
become no more than a cultural history of a modern era? At what point 
is an example only of and for the present?
Yet (post)classicism insists on a gap between the here and now of 
modernity and the past of antiquity, a gap constitutive of critical self-
consciousness, based on an awareness of how the present is different 
from the past. The exemplar plays a key role in this process of seeing 
oneself otherwise. The exemplar is, for sure, a mode of encounter with 
antiquity, a mode of knowing and of organizing knowledge of the past. 
It is also a persuasive term designed to construct a particular and par-
ticularized form of attentiveness: it is activated as a normative template 
for a present moment. But the exemplar, rhetorically the figure of a past 
historical character, event, or locus, emphatically interrupts context. An 
exemplar is not invoked as a representative cross-section of a historical 
point in time and space: it is a singular case designed to illuminate a 
single case. The exemplar insists that the past is necessary to explain 
and frame and comprehend the present. Whatever its claim on a spe-
cific historicity—and an exemplar so often speaks of a lost time with a 
hankering for an idealized past—the exemplar speaks across time. The 
exemplar, then, is first of all a persuasive genealogy that asserts the past 
as a model, that interrupts the context of the present with the claim of 
an elsewhere and other time, that reads selectively, normatively, hope-
fully. Making an exemplar for the here and now is also a way of going 
beyond the here and now, of seeing oneself from elsewhere.24
Yet—and this is the third challenge, which follows on from the sec-
ond—cultural history is a necessary if vexed element in this recognition 
of historicized reading. That is, while a history of reading is evidently 
constitutive of any form of the history of classical scholarship or the 
history of classical tradition, the impact of cultural history is more 
problematic. It is more problematic because it exposes the “con” in 
context. It is easy enough to assert the foundational historicist claim that 
things—texts, people—are of their time, and need to be understood as 
products of and in time. The difficulty comes when we try to articulate 
the dynamics between the contrasting and competing claims that there 
is value in understanding antiquity and its texts as another, passed and 
particular era; that meaning is realized in the process (as I would prefer 
to say) of reception; and that not only are we as scholars the products 
of a historical moment, but also that both we and others are capable of 
being ahead of our time, out of date, behind the times, self-consciously 
conservative, willfully radical, and so forth. It is far from clear under 
such circumstances what “putting in context” will require, even when 
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it remains an apparent imperative. In short, how situated should an 
example be? The example interrupts context, but what context does it 
itself require? How are the multiplying contingencies of the particular 
to be framed? If appealing to Heracles as an example for today disrupts 
the present with a claim to and from the past, how is the potentially 
ever-expanding figuration of the hero to be negotiated? To situate an 
example thus as an object of knowledge allows it to be known but also 
makes such knowledge more contingent, unstable, and in need of en-
gaged negotiation.
The fourth challenge follows inexorably. The subject who knows—
the critic—is also framed by the contingencies of her situatedness. So, 
to what degree is a historical self-consciousness of the positionality of 
the critic debilitating? The more that the contingency of the object of 
knowledge, and contingency of the subject who knows, is allowed, the 
more unstable the process of knowing may seem. Is it inevitable that the 
necessary move beyond traditional classicism will leave us floundering? 
Will Lucian’s parody of the skeptic—so radically unsure of everything 
that he cannot walk—find embodiment in the post-whatever critic, so 
anxious about assertion or value judgment or bias or authority that fi-
nally only a shrug of silence will do; or, worse and more likely, a constant 
reiteration of hopeless but, no doubt, excessively articulate anxiety . . . ?
In the second part of this article, I will attempt to provide some an-
swers to these questions of what is at stake in taking an example. What 
I hope to have demonstrated so far, however, is this. Classicism, as an 
ideological and epistemological relation to Greco-Roman antiquity, con-
structs an object of knowledge through idealization and genealogical 
affiliation. Integral to classicism, thus, is a logic of exemplification: it 
finds in the classical past the exemplars and paradigms for today. The 
practice of the case study within classicism takes shape within such a 
framework of knowing. The challenges to classicism mounted in recent 
decades, which can be termed postclassicism—and enforced, one should 
add, in case it is not self-evident, by globalization, changing patterns of 
education, developing forms of media, resistance to imperialism, the 
thinking of feminism, and so forth—change the nature of the object of 
classical knowledge and thus the process of making a case study, using 
an example. The exemplarity of Greece and Rome has become less and 
less self-evident, the pedestals more shaky. The need to rethink the case 
study and its role in classical scholarship has never been more insistent 
and compelling. What a classical example is of and for has never seemed 
less stable, in fields outside classics, for sure, but especially and with 
especial force within classics, the subject based on its own exemplarity.
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II
To explore the process of exemplification, I set out from an aspect 
of temporality raised in the first part of this paper. Now, from one per-
spective all literature—all art—is an exercise in reception, if reception 
is understood merely as a constructed engagement with a past, or as 
written in and as a tradition, or as an adaptation of other stories (or 
art forms). All stories are written through other stories and have a con-
structed literary past, as it were, written into them. What is distinctive 
about “classical reception,” however, within the mode of both classicism 
and postclassicism, is a self-conscious, constructed relation to antiquity. 
This is not just that classical reception is about how literature and other 
forms of art take as a subject the past of Greek and Roman antiquity (and 
I would add Hebrew and Egyptian, etc.). Rather, this very engagement 
with antiquity as a classical model—hence (post)classicism—requires a 
particular dynamics of untimeliness. It requires an explicit hypostasiza-
tion—which need not be positive—of a particular past; it requires a sense 
that the present is disrupted from that past, while it is also genealogically 
linked to it, and that the present needs this ancient past to find itself; it 
needs its sense of untimeliness to find self-expression. Classicism must 
know it is not classical, that it is out of time with the models it is adopting 
and adapting; it must know its own untimeliness. Untimeliness, in this 
sense, marks the self-consciousness—in political, aesthetic, psychologi-
cal, cultural terms—of one’s self in construction as a historical subject.
Richard Wagner will serve as a most brief, if culturally influential, ex-
ample of these dynamics of untimeliness. “I felt myself more truly at home 
in ancient Athens,” he wrote, “than in any condition which the modern 
world has to offer.”25 Because the modern world is so alienating, he 
longs for another place that is a true home—and, like Nietzsche, Hegel, 
Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl and others, finds it in an idealized Hellenic 
antiquity. This philhellenic idealism is predicated on the insufficiency of 
the present in aesthetic, psychological, and political terms. Yet although 
all roads lead across the rainbow bridges of exile toward the homeland 
of Greece (as Nietzsche put it), it requires a revolutionary modernism to 
reach that idealized state.26 Zukunftskunst, “the art of the future,” is the 
corollary of a longing for the past, by projecting the idealism of the past 
into an idealism of the future. At one level, that is, the present’s untimeli-
ness is pulled into existence by two vectors of desire—a longing for the 
lost past and a dreaming for a hoped-for future. If we turn away from 
Wagner’s prose alone, however, and start to build an audience response 
into the event of Wagner’s music theater, it is precisely the modernity 
of Wagner, his resolute and iconic contemporaneousness, that proves 
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most thrilling and most alienating to his listeners. That is, the evalua-
tion of Wagner’s music is contested precisely in terms of its timeliness: 
it is of the moment—and thus either excitingly up to date and in tune 
with its own modern era, or frighteningly challenging and discordant. 
The music is felt by its audiences to sound out the precipice of Time.
It is hard to live long with one’s own untimeliness, especially if 
untimeliness is recognized as a sign of the times. But I think that if 
reception—or (post)classicism—is to have a strong sense as a descrip-
tion of a style of cultural production, untimeliness may be a necessary 
dynamic of its working. What this means for our interest in the limits 
of the case study is twofold. First, it allows us to see one way in which 
the case studies of classical reception are articulated in and against the 
general literary or artistic culture in which they are produced—not 
just by virtue of the artwork’s integral connection with a particular 
historical past of antiquity, Greek or Roman, say, but also by virtue of a 
specific engagement with a temporality that speaks to the self-conscious 
construction of the self as a historical subject. Second—and this is the 
photographic negative of the first—it should encourage us to focus, at 
least for strategic political purposes, on eras, and examples, cases where 
this construction of the historical subject through antiquity is prevalent, 
privileged, and of broad significance. I at least find it easier to see the 
pressing insistence of the need for classical reception studies when—as 
in the Renaissance, as in Victorian Britain—the image or influence of 
classical antiquity was something worth fighting over, killing each other 
for, screaming at each other about—because of what it says about the 
historical self-understanding of modernity.
Thus—and this forms the first conclusion of this paper—in discussing 
the construction of the case study, we need to be acutely aware of the 
politics of the case study. At one level this should mean articulating why 
certain case studies are chosen. Is it because of their intense, influential, 
and evident engagement with the history and politics of the day, which 
may, as with Wagner, be integrally linked to an aesthetic argument? Or 
is it because of another narrative—a literary case, say, that attempts to 
eschew contemporary politics, such as Pope’s use of rhyming couplets 
to translate Homer; or an argument about form, that explores the use, 
say, of classical bodies in stained glass windows? Our choice of case 
studies, that is, of how case studies come to seem to be relevant, will 
always depend on a narrative about the relation between classics as a 
study and the society in which it takes place, and on an account of the 
politics of such engagement. This is to take a stance as a scholar, too, 
about which version of classics is to be privileged, what the history of 
classics is to be (as I did when I just suggested that the moments when 
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classics is thought worth screaming about were for me the most interest-
ing junctures in the discipline’s history). That is, the case study raises a 
question of responsibility as much as response—a translation of the ethical 
exemplarity embodied in the classical tradition into a contemporary 
sense of ethical and political engagement.
To decide that the history of classical scholarship is best expressed as 
a conversation over time by great men about shared questions of textual 
criticism may seem naive, but it cannot be thought innocent. To see 
the study of classics, alternatively, through the history of educational 
reform is a different set of blinkers that both reveals and obscures the 
lineaments of the field. To see it through religion would be a further 
determining narrative. And so on. In each case, the narrative of classical 
learning that justifies the selection of a case study is a critical decision 
about what matters in classics, about what impacts are most relevant, 
and about what understandings are most important.27 So too, then, the 
articulation of the case study as a case will be formulated in relation to 
such politicized choices. So, if we put together both the ability of clas-
sics to become a privileged terrain for the expression of how and why 
the past matters for the present, and the necessary implication of the 
scholar in drawing up such narratives of the place of classical study in 
society, it becomes clear that the politics of reception—at all levels—sets 
at stake the self-understanding of the subject within history.
To approach the second conclusion of this article, I want to turn to 
the question of technology and genre, again with specific regard to the 
limits of the case study, and to begin by considering photography, which 
has repeatedly been discussed specifically with regard to the impact of 
mechanical innovation and new forms of representational politics. Since 
the middle of the nineteenth century, as photography became one of the 
most widely circulated forms of representation, photography of classical 
antiquity has been a particularly charged area. The first areas especially 
to use photography include mugshots for police control of miscreants, 
visiting cards—and images of sites of biblical and classical antiquity.28 Such 
images of the archaeological past began as ways of asserting the reality of 
the world to which the photographs spoke—the truth of scripture, the 
actuality of Livy—that had been severely challenged in their authority 
by critical history and the other sciences of objective knowledge. Many 
photographs were hand-produced, costly, privileged art objects—and took 
full part in the aggressive conflicts over cultural representation in the 
nineteenth century.29 But by the end of the century, however, photography 
had become so cheap and so prevalent that history had undergone the 
postcard effect. The postcard “becomes the poor man’s phantasm: for 
a few pennies, display racks full of dreams,” writes Malek Alloula with 
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passion. “The postcard is everywhere, covering all the colonial space, 
immediately available to the tourist, the soldier, the colonist. It is at 
once their poetry and their glory captured for the ages; it is also their 
pseudoknowledge of the colony. It produces stereotypes in the manner 
of great seabirds producing guano. It is the fertilizer of the colonial 
vision.”30 We might add that images of classical desire—Wilhelm von 
Gloeden’s naked boys from Sicily, say—also moved from the art world 
of the elite magazine into the exchange and mart of smutty sexuality.
The sheer number of images of the Coliseum or the Parthenon—those 
clichés of the visual imaginary, for Freud, as for any tourist—poses a 
question to the process of exemplification integral to the case study. 
What are photographs of the grandeur that was Rome or the glory of 
Greece case studies or examples of? Mementos or souvenirs, in the 
model of Susan Stewart’s lovely study?31 Are they, as Alloula suggests, 
signs of cultural colonialism? Are they failures of the aura or originality, 
as all reproduced images in the age of mechanical production seem to 
Walter Benjamin?32 Are they how classics enters the imagination or how 
classics clashes with the imagination? Can any single image of a postcard 
become a “case study,” or is it only as a collective that they signify? On 
the one hand, recent work on the novel by Franco Moretti, constructed 
by digital techniques and insistent on itself as the opposite of close 
reading, demands that we should think of cultural products on a large 
scale; we should take huge data sets as our subject of study in order to 
understand their real cultural purchase.33 What would happen to the 
case study in classical reception if we followed this vector and resisted 
the drive toward close reading in the name of circulation, dissemination, 
prevalence? On the other hand, classicists have hugely enjoyed looking 
at the uptake of antiquity in popular culture—the reach of Ben-Hur into 
the advertising realm of flour, cars, soap, hair-oil has been a particular 
favorite—but there has been next to no extended theoretical explora-
tion that explains or explores such a phenomenon.34 If the postcard 
circulates pseudo-knowledge and fertilizes the stereotypes of colonialism, 
how does Ben-Hur flour enter the epistemology of culture?
The genres of production made possible by the technology of pho-
tography and other forms of mass production raise two questions, then, 
for the epistemology of classical reception and its examples. On the 
one hand, it is often assumed, I think, in reception studies that the 
author, the audience, and the critics are all “subjects who know,” and 
are all trained in classical knowledge. The author works with an allusive 
style, based on a reading of classical texts; the audience and critics (as 
a super-audience, the arbiters and makers of taste), share such a read-
ing and enjoy the playfulness of the author’s engagement, a playfulness 
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that may be searingly serious and painful, of course. We all share the 
classical tradition. At a more sophisticated level, the insecurities, failures 
of knowing, and politics of collusion in reading such allusiveness have 
become recognized.35 Yet while a film like O Brother, Where Art Thou? an-
nounces it is based on Homer in the first shot, the film’s writers claim 
never to have read the Odyssey except in a cartoon version, and its huge 
audience cannot be expected to have read it either, and cannot be ex-
pected to enjoy the philological joke of its hero singing a song entitled 
“I Am a Man of Constant Sorrow,” clearly a translation of Odyssey book 
19, l.117. What happens to forms of “reception” when the sending and 
receiving of the classical tradition is so playfully disregarded—is asserted 
and flouted in the same moment? It is imperative for analyzing works of 
modern culture in particular (though not solely modern work, for sure) 
that the dynamics of ignorance and abandonment becomes part of the 
epistemology of reception theory. The limits of the case study in recep-
tion theory are to be formulated through the practices of ignorance as 
much as classical knowing, through abandonment and flouting as much 
as affiliation. Since the classical tradition has become so fragmented and 
cracked and unshared, the status of the example become more fragile, 
more open to the interference, noise, and disregard of the subjects 
who do not know.
On the other hand, the profusion of reproduced objects is all around 
us. I am myself unexercised by the semantics of Ben-Hur flour, where it 
is difficult to progress beyond the recognition that the branders of the 
flour wish to utilize the popularity of the book Ben-Hur to increase the 
popularity of the flour (though no doubt a card-carrying Baudrillardian 
would have a good go at a journey into the semantics and economics of 
the popularity of popular culture). Rather, I am more taken by the way 
in which the logic of ignorance and fragmentation I have just discussed 
becomes fully a part of a modernist poetics of reproduction. The genius 
of Andy Warhol is paradigmatic here in the most insightful way. He may 
be most famous for multiple images of objects whose status is dependent 
upon the repetition of their image, whether it is the large-scale economics 
of the selling of huge numbers of soup cans, or the cultural celebrity of 
Marilyn Monroe’s endlessly reproduced image, shot by shot. Repetition 
is the form and subject of his art. But for me some of the most intel-
lectually gripping pictures he made were his late stitched photographs 
of nude hustlers. So, he stitched together four identical images of a 
naked man, hired on the street and posed as the Barberini Faun.36 The 
repetition of the image moves the piece away from a witty joke on an 
old image, and starts to ask questions about repetition and desire. How 
many Barberini Fauns make up the erotic imagination? What role is 
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there for repetition in the imagery of desire? How different is one hustler 
(body, fantasy) from another? How many times do you need to look at 
the sexualized body? Is your eroticism no more than the repetition of 
past images? Can you desire without cliché? Or repetition? Or, as we 
might say, without entering the classical tradition . . .? Those old Greek 
bodies keep getting repeated in our visual repertoire of desire. In this 
modern world, the singularity of the example is constantly threatened 
by the mechanics and erotics of repetition. Here we go again. . . . An 
exemplar, by definition, is repeatable—but what does the structure of 
repetition do to the logic of the exemplar?
So my second conclusion is this. To construct a case study is to com-
mit to a model of (social) epistemology—for classical reception studies 
about where and what classical knowing is, and the place of ignorance 
and silence in the work of constructing a classical tradition; and about 
the place of repetition in such a work of constructing the self in and 
against such a tradition. The exemplar becomes fragile, thus, because of 
the fragmentation and diffusion of the tradition in which it participates; 
the dynamics of unsharing are also crucial and integral to the dynamics 
of cultural collusion. The case study of classical reception always has the 
ability to collapse into a case of another infection altogether.
For my third conclusion, I turn toward a recent book on classical recep-
tion that introduces a subject that had previously slipped under the radar, 
namely, Gideon Nisbet’s study of the reception of Greek epigrams in the 
nineteenth century.37 In the last decades of the nineteenth century and 
the first years of the twentieth, it became a fashion for the gentlemen of 
the Empire, at home and especially abroad, to make translations of the 
epigrams of the Greek Anthology, especially those poems connected with 
love, and to circulate them especially in small, privately printed editions, 
or in small runs from standard houses. Nisbett has collected many of 
these volumes and explored how they acted as signs and symptoms of 
a culture of desiring, particularly in the often-repressed world of male 
desire for other males—though the phenomenon was also a broader 
sign of cultural belonging among elite men. It seems to me that this 
phenomenon provides a fascinating set of questions for the case study 
in reception theory, which picks up a great deal of what I have been 
discussing and will add a third conclusion to my argument.
Each of these little poems is designed to be a jewel and to be appreci-
ated for its jewel-like clarity and wit, no doubt. But how many need to 
be read to make a case study? Let us take as our example the wonderful 
and much celebrated translation of a Callimachus epigram by William 
Johnson Cory, that begins, “They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you 
were dead.” Can we just read Cory’s Heraclitus poem, as a translation, 
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as it were? Surely it needs to be seen, as it was published, in a carefully 
selected series that make up a book of poems. It was, however, also 
designed to stand within a series of such books, circulated amongst con-
senting adults. How many such books make up the study of the genre, 
the necessary frame of any individual example? The epigram, that is, is 
the perfect place to explore the logic of scale inherent in the problem 
of exemplification and literature: from a small individual poem to a 
widely circulated genre. How a case study is constructed will depend 
on a critical decision about such dynamics of scale.
Each poem, as a translation of a known poem, and often with a line 
of Greek added to the title or as an epigraph to the poem, also requires 
a form of double reading. These translations are for people who do and 
will read Greek and will hear the Greek through the English. So we 
and they know that Callimachus wrote “εἶπε τις Ἡρἀκλειτε τέον μόρον,” 
which we might translate with lumpy literalness, “Someone told me, 
Heraclitus, your fate . . . .” Cory’s brilliant rendition, “They told me, 
Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,” is made so powerfully moving 
by the repetition of “they told me,” and becomes particularly effective 
and affecting against the single and simple eipe tis, “someone told.” The 
echoing “they told me, they told me,” however, also recalls how many 
times this poem has been translated and reversioned. There is a self-
reflexivity of literary reproduction in the repetition of “they told me,” 
an echo of the tradition of echoes that is the classical tradition. So a 
double reading is required, hearing in the English a reworking of the 
Greek, a cultural difference of expressivity between the two languages, a 
recognition of syntactic difference and the search to transcend it, a form 
of attention trained through years of schooling in verse composition as 
the translation of English into Latin and Greek. “They told me” is also 
the sign of received tradition (a mark of fama, as Philip Hardie would 
have it).38 The epitaph for Heraclitus is itself a poem about the survival 
of poems against the dust of human life. The translation thus becomes 
a way of engaging with and commenting on the classical tradition it is 
participating in. It also echoes against other translations of this very 
well-known poem: that is how its brilliance is calibrated as a translation. 
Cory’s poem is a case study in how examples become increasingly diffuse 
as multiple audiences, reading strategies, and a self-consciousness about 
tradition are built into our model of comprehension.
Now Cory was a schoolmaster at Eton who was forced to leave the 
school because of a scandal to do with his rather too public, flamboyant, 
and sentimental attachment to his pupils. His memoirs were published 
by subscription, and the list of twenty-three subscribers included a circle 
of Etonians, many of whom had known him, and all of whom admired 
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him. He was a figure of the imagination for a widening group of men 
in the English literary scene who were as much attracted to his persona 
as to his poems. The title Ionica to the insiders screamed its lyric roots 
in Greek desire. Cory himself retired to Hampstead, where he surprised 
everyone, including himself, by marrying and finishing his days teaching 
girls Greek. But his charisma and charm meant that he left behind him 
something of a cult of romantic friendship among the boys, which both 
engaged and exercised the schoolmasters, and made Ionica an icon in 
the increasingly anxious world of British eroticized homosociality.39 The 
Heraclitus poem is also about men sitting and drinking and hanging out 
together through the night and, in terms to strike a particular chord 
with Victorian schoolmasters, about how you might not hear about a 
former favorite for some time until his death in the far-flung reaches of 
the Empire was reported. The poem and its translation also make up a 
case study in the cultural role of poetry in homosocial desire and its ex-
pression—both as a translation and as a text for circulation. The cultural 
history that determines the reception of this poem is an integral part of 
its functioning as a work of “classical reception.” The more intimately 
this cultural history is explored, the less easy it is to integrate such close 
reading into the analysis of the genre of translations of epigrams as a 
wide-scale phenomenon within the even wider culture of translations.
Cory was a highly self-conscious writer, and his readers were equally 
self-conscious, especially about the reticent expression of desire. Greek 
was a necessary alibi. As innumerable historians of sexuality have empha-
sized, the term “homosexuality” has a short history. The pathologizing 
of sexuality begins in the last years of the nineteenth century and only 
becomes a culturally recognizable norm after the First World War, when 
the effects of first the Oscar Wilde trial and then the trial of Radclyffe 
Hall established a pathologized model of transgressive homosexuality 
in public discourse.40 Cory and his pals lived through this transitional 
period (and many were actively involved with the work of Havelock Ellis 
and others that was so instrumental in such pathologization).41 Reading 
these self-conscious expressions of a reticent and concealed desire also 
becomes, then, a self-implicating gesture for the reader. How much desire 
you hear, and what sort of desire, will be self-exposing, as you reinvent 
the history of homosexuality again. It is simply not possible to maintain 
an objective, externalized critical position in evaluating the reception of 
such verse. There is for us, as for Cory and his early readers, a dynamic 
of knowingness that always implicates and undermines the subject who 
presumes to know. What a critic makes Cory a case study of, and how, will 
always be telling. My third conclusion, then, is that the reader’s desire is 
a constitutive but disruptive factor in the construction of the case study.
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We cannot do without the case study or the example, but unless we 
engage with more methodological sophistication in the politics, episte-
mology, and role of desire in the processes of exemplification (my three 
conclusions), we will not be able to appreciate adequately the complexity 
of the case study as a form in classical reception, or of the example in 
literary studies more generally. In supplementing the opening argument 
about the failure of exemplarity through a turn to the historicism of 
reception study, we have repeatedly rediscovered how the process of 
articulating a test case is enfolded back into a set of further questions 
about politics, epistemology, and desire, and how, thus, the idea of tradi-
tion itself cannot repress the slippage and intellectual violence involved 
in its strategies of exemplification. In short, tradition is a constructed, 
fragmented, challenging concept at the heart of contemporary discussion 
of classics in and as history—and central to the construction of literary 
and cultural tradition is the problematic necessity of the example.
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